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We decompose fiscal policy in three components: i) responsiveness, ii) persistence and iii) 
discretion. Using a sample of 132 countries, our results point out that fiscal policy tends to 
be more persistent than to respond to output conditions. We also found that while the 
effect of cross-country covariates is positive (negative) for discretion, it is negative 
(positive) for persistence thereby suggesting that countries with higher persistence have 
lower discretion and vice versa. In particular, while government size, country size and 
income have negative effects on the discretion component of fiscal policy, they tend to 
increase fiscal policy persistence.  
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In the last decade, several studies in the economic literature have assessed fiscal policy 
characteristics. Most of these studies analyze the responsiveness of fiscal policy, that is, 
the response of fiscal policy to output. Other contributions analyze the extent to which 
fiscal discretion impacts on the macroeconomic environment with the final objective to 
solve the trade-off between the degree of fiscal discipline and the necessary flexibility to 
deal with automatic stabilizers. Interestingly, few empirical studies asses the relevance of a 
third fiscal policy characteristic: persistence. Generally speaking, fiscal persistence can be 
considered as a measure of the degree of dependence of current fiscal behaviour on its own 
past developments. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence that also accounts 
for this latter fiscal characteristic.  
 
In particular, we extend the analysis of Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2006) in several ways: i) 
we also compute a measure of fiscal persistence, allowing to cross-check persistence and 
discretion; ii) the abovementioned three fiscal components are obtained both for 
government spending and revenue; iii) we analyse the determinants of all three fiscal 
components with a set of macroeconomic, political and institutional variables, and 
geographical variables; iv) finally we also use several datasets. 
 
In order to pursue our objectives we employ a two-stage empirical strategy. In the fist 
stage, we decompose fiscal policy, and in more detail government spending and revenues, 
in three components: i) responsiveness, ii) persistence and iii) discretion. In the second 
stage of our analysis, using the estimates of responsiveness, persistence and discretion, we 
employ a cross-country analysis in order to identify the common set of economic, political 
and institutional variables explaining those estimates.  
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Our analysis covers a set of 132 developed and developing countries over the period 1980-
2007, as well as data for EU-15 countries over the period 1970-2007. The main results of 
the paper can be summarized as follows: a) fiscal policy is not responsive in most of the 
countries in the sample (i.e. responsiveness is generally small and in many cases not 
statistically significant) while persistence is the dominant component; b) more 
interestingly, there exists a significant trade-off between persistence and discretion. Both 
for revenue and spending, persistence is negatively correlated to the discretion component 
thereby suggesting that countries with higher persistence have lower discretion. These 
findings are supported by the results of the second part of the analysis where we carry out 
a cross-country estimation approach to identify the source of fluctuations of both 
persistence and discretion components. According to the previous empirical finding, 
suggesting that a negative relationship between discretion and persistence exists, we find 
that while government size, country size and income have negative effects on the 
discretion component of fiscal policy, they tend to increase fiscal policy persistence. 
Moreover, we find that macro and political and institutional variables are less relevant for 



















In the last decade, several studies in the economic literature have assessed fiscal 
policy characteristics. Most of these studies analyze the responsiveness of fiscal policy, 
that is, the response of fiscal policy to output, in order to explore the effectiveness of 
automatic stabilizers. Other contributions analyze the extent to which fiscal discretion 
impacts on the macroeconomic environment. 
Interestingly, few empirical studies asses the relevance of a third fiscal policy 
characteristic: persistence. Generally speaking, fiscal persistence can be considered as a 
measure of the degree of dependence of current fiscal behaviour on its own past 
developments. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence that also accounts for 
this latter fiscal characteristic. In particular, the aim of this paper is to disentangle fiscal 
policy (both government spending and revenue) in three components: responsiveness, 
persistence and discretion, and to assess which variables make these components to vary 
across countries. Thus, compared to existing work on the literature, we provide a broader 
and more comprehensive approach to assess the behaviour of fiscal policy (in terms of 
responsiveness, persistence and discretion) and its determinants. 
In particular, we extend the analysis of Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2006) in several 
ways: i) we also compute a measure of fiscal persistence, allowing to cross-check 
persistence and discretion; ii) the abovementioned three fiscal components are obtained 
both for government spending and revenue; iii) we analyse the determinants of all three 
fiscal components with a set of macroeconomic, political and institutional variables, and 
geographical variables; iv) finally we also use several datasets. 
From a methodological point of view, we consider the elasticity of government 
revenues and expenditures to output as a measure of the fiscal responsiveness to economic 
conditions. We relate the degree of fiscal persistence to the long-memory properties of the  
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processes describing the behaviour of both government expenditures and revenues. 
Finally, we identify discretion as the part of government spending and revenue that does 
not correspond to systematic responses to output conditions and in past values of 
government spending and revenue, but is instead the consequence of exogenous political 
processes or extraordinary non-economic circumstances. 
Our analysis covers a set of 132 developed and developing countries over the 
period 1980-2007, as well as data for EU-15 countries over the period 1970-2007. The 
main results of the paper can be summarized as follows: a) fiscal policy is a-cyclical in 
most of the countries in the sample (i.e. responsiveness is generally small and in most of 
the cases not statistically significant) while persistence is the dominant component; b) 
more interestingly, there exists a significant trade-off between persistence and discretion. 
Both for revenue and spending, persistence is negatively correlated to the discretion 
component thereby suggesting that countries with higher persistence have lower discretion. 
These findings are supported by the results of the second part of the analysis. In fact, we 
found that regressing both discretion and persistence estimates on a common set of 
explanatory variables, the sign of the coefficient associated to many of these cross-country 
covariates is opposite in the two regressions.  
Moreover, we find that macro and political and institutional variables can not 
account for responsiveness, once regional dummies are considered. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the 
related literature. Section three explains the empirical strategy used to identify the 
responsiveness, persistence and discretionary parts of both government spending and 
revenue. It also illustrates the strategy used to identify the determinants of fiscal 
characteristics within a set of economic, institutional and political variables. Section four  
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presents and discusses the results. Section five concludes with the main findings, policy 
implications and suggestion for future works. 
 
2. Literature 
The existing related literature has usually analyzed two of three abovementioned 
components of fiscal policy. On the one hand, the responsiveness of fiscal policy to output, 
and on the other hand, the discretionary part of fiscal policy. These two issues have 
deserved great interest since both are crucial for output stabilization and, therefore, 
indirectly for growth and aggregate welfare
1. 
The issue of responsiveness of fiscal policy has received increasing attention from 
researchers both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. 
From a theoretical point of view, standard Keynesian models imply that fiscal 
policy should be counter-cyclical, i.e. government spending (taxes) should rise (decrease) 
in recessions and increase in booms. At the other stream, tax-smoothing models inspired 
by Barro (1979) imply that government will smooth both tax rate and government 
spending by borrowing in recessions and repaying in booms, i.e. government spending will 
be uncorrelated with changes in GDP, while tax revenue will be positively correlated.  
From an empirical point of view, the evidence is quite mixed, varying across 
spending and revenues categories as well as across countries.  For OECD countries, some 
research shows that spending is counter-cyclical (Gali, 1994), while others show no 
discernible pattern (e.g. Fiorito, 1997; Gavin and Perotti, 1997b). The differences in these 
results depend on the components of spending being measured. For example, Gali (1994) 
studies government consumption and investment in a simple cross-country regression for a 
sample of 22 OECD countries and finds that both taxes and government purchases seem to 
                                                           
1 Regarding the relationship between output volatility, growth and welfare, see, for example, Ramey and 
Ramey (1995), Epaulard and Pommeret (2003), Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2005, 2006), Barlevy (2004), 
Furceri (2007, 2008) and Imbs (2007).  
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be effectively working as "automatic stabilizers", with government purchases following a 
counter-cyclical pattern. Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994) and Fiorito (1997), on the other 
hand, study specifically government consumption in the G-7 countries and find that the 
expenditures are either counter-cyclical or a-cyclical.  
The limited number of empirical studies for developing countries suggests that 
government spending tends to be pro-cyclical. For example, Gavin and Perotti (1997a) 
find that fiscal policy is highly pro-cyclical in Latin America; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and 
Vegh (2004) find that fiscal policy is pro-cyclical in their sub-sample of 83 low- and 
middle-income countries; Braun (2001) finds that government expenditure is pro-cyclical 
in a panel of 35 developing countries for the period 1970-1998. 
The conventional wisdom that emerges from these studies is that fiscal policy is 
counter-cyclical or a-cyclical in most developed countries, while it is pro-cyclical in 
developing countries. This result is corroborated by Lane (2003) who finds that the 
capability to implement fiscal control procedures is positively correlated with the level of 
development (measured by output per capita). This implies that richer countries enjoy less 
pro-cyclical government spending. 
Several explanations have been advanced to explain the cross-country variation in 
the degree of fiscal cyclicality especially between developing and industrial countries. 
Important factors behind cyclicality of fiscal policy are political and institutional 
ones. For example, Talvi and Vegh (2005) find that pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy is 
related to political distortions. They develop an optimal fiscal policy model in which 
running budget surpluses is costly because they create pressures to increase public 
spending. Given this distortion, a government that faces large fluctuations in the tax base 
will find it optimal to run pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Considering the differences in tax base 
between countries, the authors conclude that while fiscal policy in the G-7 countries  
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appears to be broadly consistent with Barro’s tax smoothing proposition, in developing 
countries government spending and taxes are highly pro-cyclical.  
Persson (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2001), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), also 
find that political and institutional factors matter also for fiscal responsiveness.  In 
particular, while Persson (2001) and Persson and Tabellini (2001) find that parliamentary 
and majority based systems are related to cyclicality of fiscal policy, Alesina and Tabellini 
(2005) show that most of the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries can be 
explained by high levels of corruption.  
Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) argue that fiscal policy is less anti-cyclical in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries in election years. Similar results in U.S. 
states are documented by Sorensen, Wu and Yosha (2001). Using data for OECD 
countries, Lane (2003) shows that countries with volatile output and dispersed political 
power are the most likely to run pro-cyclical fiscal policies.  
Finally, an interesting contribution is the work of Galì and Perotti (2003). After 
estimating fiscal policy rules for eleven EMU countries over the period 1980-2002, they 
test whether fiscal constraints of the EMU – as embedded in the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability Growth Path – may be conducive of pro-cyclical fiscal policies. According to 
their results, anti-cyclical policies became stronger after the adoption of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Galì (2005) demonstrates that this latter evidence holds in general for all 
industrialized countries. Afonso (2008) also finds evidence of counter-cyclical responses 
of fiscal policy for the EU countries. 
The second issue of fiscal policy that has been considered in the literature regards 
the discretionary component of fiscal policy. A large number of studies provide evidence 
that discretionary spending is strongly and negatively related to the quality of institutions 
as well as to political and budgetary constraints. Fatás and Mihov (2003) analyze the  
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political and institutional determinants of discretionary fiscal policy and their effects on 
output volatility and economic growth. They use the term discretionary to refer to changes 
in fiscal positions that represent neither automatic reaction to economic conditions nor can 
be related to persistent changes in budget items. Using data from 91 countries, they find 
that highly volatile discretionary fiscal policy exerts a strong destabilizing effect on the 
economy. Additionally, fiscal policy is explained to a large extent by such variables as the 
characteristics of electoral and political systems and the lack of political constraints. They 
conclude that institutional arrangements that constrain discretion via checks and balances 
allow nations to achieve higher rates of economic growth and reduce macroeconomic 
instability. 
More recently, Fatás and Mihov (2006), using data from 48 US states, explore the 
role that “rules” and institutions play in determining discretionary fiscal policy and look at 
whether the same rules and institutions influence the cyclicality of fiscal policy. 
Cyclicality is defined as the elasticity of government spending with respect to output. They 
find that strict budgetary restrictions lead to lower policy volatility and reduce the 
responsiveness of fiscal policy to output shocks. These two results should have opposite 
effects on output volatility. While less discretion should reduce volatility, less 
responsiveness of fiscal policy might amplify business cycles. 
According to the empirical evidence reviewed above, political and institutional 
variables can affect the composition of government spending in its discretionary, 
persistence and responsiveness components. Thus, ultimately, it is natural to expect that 
countries differ in the behaviour of both government spending and revenue along these 
three elements.  
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3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Fiscal Measures of Responsiveness, Persistence and Discretion 
Following Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2006), in order to differentiate between 
persistence, responsiveness and discretion in government spending and revenue we 
estimate for each country i (with i =1,…,N ) the following regressions: 
 
  () ( ) ( )
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i t i G Y G , , 1 , , , log log log ε γ β α + + + + = − Z δ  (1) 
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i t i R Y R , , 1 , , , log log log ε γ β α + + + + = − Z δ                 (2)  
 
where G is real government spending, R is real government revenue, Y is real GDP, and Z 
is a set of controls including also time trend
2.  
The estimates of the country-specific coefficients βi, γi  and σi in (1) and in (2) 
(where σi is the standard deviation of the residuals of the above regressions) will represent 
respectively our measures of responsiveness, persistence, and a quantitative estimate of 
discretionary fiscal policy. In order to get these estimates, we include as control variables 
(i.e. the vector Zi) the current and the lagged value of real oil prices, the current inflation 
rate and a linear time trend. Oil prices are included since they affect the state of the 
economy and more importantly because they contribute significantly to total revenue for 
some of the countries in the sample. We include inflation to ensure that our results are not 
driven by high inflation episodes. We also consider a time trend in our specifications, since 
government spending and revenue can also have a deterministic time trend in addition to 
the stochastic one. Finally, in order to control for possible endogeneity we use past values 
of real GDP as instruments. 
                                                           
2 The results are qualitatively unchanged if we explicit the variables in differences.  
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3.2 What Matters for the Fiscal Measures? 
Once we obtain the estimates for responsiveness (
R G
i
, ˆ β ), persistence (
R G
i




, ˆ σ ) of fiscal policy we can explain cross-country variation in fiscal policy 
behaviour, regressing those estimates on a set of explanatory variables that the literature 
has found to be related to fiscal policy.  
We estimate the following three cross-country equations (six considering both 
estimations for the spending and the revenue equation):  
 
( ) ∑ ∑ ∑ + + + + =
jj j i ij j ij j ij j
R G
i E P D ξ θ φ δ α σ 1
, ˆ log                    (3) 
∑ ∑ ∑ + + + + =
jj j i ij j ij j ij j
R G
i E P D υ θ φ δ α γ 2
, ˆ                            (4) 
∑ ∑ ∑ + + + + =
jj j i ij j ij j ij j
R G
i E P D ω θ φ δ α β 3
, ˆ                           (5) 
 
for i = 1,…, N  and  where: Ej denotes macroeconomic variables; Pj denotes political and 
institutional  variables; Dj denotes demographic and geographical variables; ω,ν, and ξ  are 
well-behaved residuals; α’s are nuisance coefficients; δ, φ, and θ are our coefficients of 
interest. 
In more detail, the set of controls consists of the following variables:
3  
i)  Macroeconomic variables (E): a) GDP per capita; b) openness; c) GDP deflator-
based inflation rate; d) government size, and e) country size .
4  
ii)  Political and institutional variables (P): a) an index of the level of democracy; b) an 
index for political stability; c) an index for presidential versus parliamentary electoral 
                                                           
3 See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of the variables and sources. 
4 As found in Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), Rodrick (1998), Fatás and Mihov (2001, 2003) and Furceri and 
Poplawski (2008), economic variables are found to be correlated to both persistence, automatic stabilizers 
and spending volatility. Among others, see these papers for a more detailed discussion.  
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system, d) an index that accounts for constitutional limits on the number of years the 
executive can serve before new elections; e) an index of government effectiveness; f) the 
Herfindahl index of parties concentration in the government, g) a dummy if the chief 
executive is a military chief.
5 
iii)  Geographical variables (D)
6: a) the log of absolute latitude (kilometres from the 
equator); b) regional dummies for developing countries from b1) Latin America, b2) Sub-
Saharan Africa, b3) East Asia, b4) South Asia, b5) Europe-Central Asia, b6) and Middle 
East-North Africa.
7  
Since our dependent variables are based on estimates, the regression residuals can 
be thought of as having two components. The first component is sampling error (the 
difference between the true value of the dependent variable and its estimated value). The 
second component is the random shock that would have been obtained even if the 
dependent variable was directly observed as opposed to estimated. This would lead to an 
increase in the standard deviation of the estimates, which would lower the t-statistics. This 
means that any correction to the presence of this un-measurable error term will increase 
the significance of our estimates
8. 
  We estimate equations (4)-(5) by Weighted Least Squares (WLS). This choice 
takes account of the fact that the dependent variables are measured with different degrees 
                                                           
5 The economic literature has generally focused on political and institutional characteristics to explain cross 
country differences in government spending (Drazen, 2000; Persson, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2001). See 
Fatás and Mihov (2003) for a more detailed discussion. 
6 Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) have found that geographical variables are important to explain cross country 
differences in government spending. 
7 As suggested by La Porta et al. (1999), it is likely that latitude from the equator, income and regional 
dummies are related to the quality of government and institutions. 
8  Related to this problem would be the possibility of heteroskedasticity. In most of our estimations 
heteroskedasticity turns out not to be a problem. When it does, we correct for that using White standard 
errors.  
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of precision across countries, and of the fact that some of the estimated values of our 
dependent variables are not statistically significant from zero.
9  
 
4. Results and discussion 
We use data from the IMF World Economic Outlook for a set of 132 countries for 
which we have data available from 1980 to 2007 (see the data Appendix for further 
details).
10 Moreover, using data from the European Commission AMECO database, we 
perform a similar exercise for the 15 “old” members of the European Union (EU-15), for 
which the time sample broadly spans between 1960 and 2007. 
 
4.1 Quantitative Estimates for Responsiveness, Persistence and Discretion 
  We start our empirical analysis by estimating the coefficients of responsiveness, 
discretion and persistence. The results relative to both government spending and revenue, 
for the entire set of countries are reported in Table 1. Looking at the table it is possible to 
see that in terms of magnitude the coefficient of persistence in the great majority of the 
cases is bigger than the one of responsiveness. This is also confirmed by the fact, that 
while the coefficient of persistency is statistically significant in most of the cases (73 times 
for spending and 68 times for revenue) the coefficient used as our measure of fiscal 
responsiveness is statistically significant for a smaller number of cases (42 times for 
spending and 48 for revenue). Thus, it seems that overall, fiscal policy tends to be more 
persistent than to respond to current output conditions. Moreover, it is interesting to note 
that while government revenue reacts relatively more to output than government spending, 
spending overall seems to be more persistent than revenue. 
                                                           
9 See, Lane (2003) for a similar approach. All the results presented do not qualitatively change when we 
estimate equations (3)-(5) by OLS. 
10 We have also analyzed data from the World Development Indicator CD-ROM 2007. The results with this 
data set are broadly similar and available upon request. However, for the IMF we had more data availability, 
especially for government revenue, and for many countries a longer time span was also available, which is 
needed for a meaningful estimation of the time-series regression.  
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  We remark that our discretion estimates are computed as the standard deviation of 
the residuals from both government spending and revenue equations. Thus, it is clear that 
the lower and less significant are the coefficients of responsiveness and persistence the 
higher will be the component of discretion
11. This argument, together with the fact that 
fiscal policy seems to be more persistent than responsive, suggests a negative relation 
between the measures of persistence and discretion. This intuition is empirically 
confirmed. Figure 1 provides the scatter plot of our measures of persistence against 
discretion exhibiting a negative relation between these two variables. In particular, the 
estimate of this simple bivariate relation for the spending equation is: 
               ( )
) 39 . 5 (           ) 89 . 0 (             







                                        
with R
2 = 0.18 (t statistics are in parenthesis). The negative relationship also holds for the 
revenue equation (see Figure 2):
12  
                ( )
) 16 . 4 (           ) 01 . 0 (             







                                       
with R
2 = 0.12 (t statistics are in parenthesis). Thus, it seems that countries with higher 
persistence have a lower discretionary component of fiscal policy. In Table 2 we also 
report a rank analysis for our measure of persistence and discretion.  
  In order to check for the robustness of our results, we consider another data source 
for both revenues and government spending: the AMECO dataset comprising data from 
1960 to 2007 for European Union countries. Therefore, we have considered the “old” EU-
15 countries, with exception of Luxemburg, for which data are not available for the period 
                                                           
11 In fact, the lower the significance of the coefficients, the lower the R-squared of the regression, and the 
higher the variance of the residuals. 
12 The correlation between 
G
i γˆ  and  ( )
G
i σ ˆ ln  equals to -0.43 while the correlation between 
R
i γˆ  and  ( )
R
i σ ˆ ln  
equals to -0.34.  
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1988-89. For comparative purposes, we have decided to include also the United States and 
Japan. 
  Table 3 reports parameter estimates of responsiveness, persistence and discretion 





i γˆ  are always statistically significant (at 1% for all countries), 
estimates ofβ s are significant only for 62% of the cases (10 countries out of 16 for both 
revenues and spending). Moreover, we also find a negative correlation betweenγ  
coefficients and their corresponding discretionary components. In particular, we find that 
the cross-country correlation between
G
i γˆ and  ( )
G
i σ ˆ log  equals -0.14 while the cross-country 
correlation between 
R
i γˆ  and  ( )
R
i σ ˆ log  is -0.32. 
  The above results corroborate our previous conclusions: a) persistence is the 
dominant component of both government spending and revenue while evidence about their 
responsiveness to the economic conditions is less clear; b) there is a negative relationship 
between the degree of persistence and discretion. 
  
4.2 Determinants of the Fiscal Measures 
In the previous section we found a significant and negative relation between 
discretion and persistence. On the one hand, this is partly explained by the fact that fiscal 
policy is not responsive for many countries in our sample. On the other hand, these results 
can be explained by the fact that if spending is left to discretionary actions and political 
decision its development will be less persistent, deviating more from the trend. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that we cannot infer any causal relation between 
these two components of fiscal policy since they are both simultaneously determined by 
macroeconomic, institutional, political and geographical variables. Thus, it is also likely to 
expect that the sign of some of these variables will be different in the econometric  
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specification for our measures of persistence and discretion. In other words we expect that 
(at least for some variables) if a cross-country covariate has a negative (positive) impact on 
discretion it should have a positive (negative) impact on persistence.  
  We start our analysis by estimating equation 3 for government spending G in order 
to explain the respective discretion component. Results are reported in Table 4. In each 
column of the table we present a different specification of the controls. Starting with the 
first column, we can see that all the macro variables (with the exception of openness) are 
significantly related to discretionary spending and with the expected sign. Discretionary 
spending is negatively related to government size, since usually bigger governments have 
more stable government spending and automatic stabilizers are larger (Fatás and Mihov, 
2001). Income (GDP per capita) is negatively related to discretionary spending, since it is 
likely that poorer countries have a more volatile business cycle due to less developed 
financial markets, and at the same time may resort more often to discretionary fiscal policy 
(Rand and Tarp, 2002). Inflation is positively related to higher discretionary spending 
volatility, since higher inflation corresponds to higher price volatility affecting thereby 
discretionary spending. Finally, smaller countries tend to have more discretion (lower 
volatility of government spending). In fact, as argued by Furceri and Poplawski (2008) a 
negative relationship between government spending volatility and country size can be 
explained by two arguments: i) to the extent that government spending is used for fine 
tuning purposes, smaller economies, characterized by more volatile output and more 
exposure to idiosyncratic shocks, may use government spending more aggressively; ii) to 
the extent that public goods are of a non-rival nature, increasing returns to scale of varying 
government spending may originate from the higher ability to spread the cost of financing 
it over a larger pool of taxpayers.  
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  In the second column of Table 4 we present the results obtained when institutional 
variables are taken into account. While the macroeconomic variables continue to be 
significant, we find that also government effectiveness is significantly and negatively 
related to discretionary spending. This is in line with previous results in the literature 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2001; Fatás and Mihov, 2003). Moreover, we find that considering 
alternatively different proxies for the quality of institutions (voice and accountability; 
political stability; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption) the results are 
almost unchanged (due to the high correlation among these indicators)
13. 
  In the third column of Table 4, we show the results when political variables are 
also included. We can see that the political system proxy variables, parties’ concentration, 
the dummy for military chief and for the presence for a finite term are also related to our 
discretion measure. In particular, in line with Persson and Tabellini (2001), we find that 
the presidential system is associated with more discretionary spending, since in a 
parliamentary system the executive is supported by the parties in the parliament and 
therefore is constrained in the implementation of policy by the threat of a no-confidence 
vote. In a presidential system the president does not face the confidence requirement and 
hence can alter more easily policy either for opportunistic or partisan reasons. Therefore, 
presidential regimes may be associated with more volatile discretionary policy. 
  We also find that a lower concentration (lower Herfindahl index) in the 
government leads to higher discretion, since proportional systems lead to coalitions and 
fiscal deadlocks which delay stabilizations and increase discretionary spending (as argued 
by Alesina and Perotti, 1994).  
Finally, the presence of a finite term (a dummy that assumes 1 if the numbers of 
mandates is limited, and 0 otherwise) makes the government more accountable and 
disincentive discretionary measures (Ferejohn, 1986), while a military chief (dummy 
                                                           
13 Results are not reported, but are vailble upon request.  
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assumes 1 if this is the case) tends to result in the use of fiscal policy in a more activist 
way. The results are robust when we include geographical and regional variables.  
We now proceed to analyze the determinants for persistence of government 
spending. In Table 5 we report the results of estimating equation 4. In particular, as we did 
for the estimate of our discretion equation, we report four columns each presenting a 
different specification of the set of controls. 
As already argued, we should expect at least for some of the controls, that if a cross 
country covariate has a negative (positive) impact on discretion it should have a positive 
(negative) impact on the persistence of government spending. This intuition is confirmed 
by our results. In fact, looking at the first column of Table 5, we can see that most of the 
macroeconomic variables are statistically significant and they have opposite signs with 
respect to the volatility of spending discretion.  
However there are exceptions. For example, institutional variables are not 
significant in the specification for fiscal persistence but they are significant in the fiscal 
discretion specification. Other variables such as military chief and finite term enter with 
the same sign in both the persistence and the discretionary equation. In particular, we find 
that countries with higher political stability and with a military chief have a more 
persistent government spending. In contrast, countries where the executive has a given 
finite term or in which the executive represent special interests have a less persistent 
government spending. 
  Given the high correlation between spending and revenue in our sample (0.9) it is 
likely to expect that the determinants of discretion and persistence have a similar effect on 
spending and revenue. However, as we discussed in section 4.1, government revenue tends 
to be relatively less persistent than government spending. Thus, the fact that both  
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components of discretion and persistence of government revenue are affected in a similar 
way by our set of explanatory variables cannot be taken for granted. 
  In Table 6 and 7, we report the estimates of equations (3) and (4) for government 
revenue. Focusing first on the revenue discretion equation (Table 6), we can observe that 
similarly to the volatility of government spending discretion, government size, country 
size, income, government effectiveness, parliamentary system and veto drops are 
negatively associated with the discretion component of revenue. In contrast, countries with 
higher inflation and characterized by lower concentration of parties tend to have more 
government revenue discretion.   
  Analyzing the results for revenue persistence (Table 7) we can see that, as for the 
spending specification, macroeconomic variables such as income and country size are 
significant and they have opposite sign with respect to the revenue discretion equation. In 
contrast, government effectiveness, political stability, parliamentary system and party 
concentration have the same sign in both the persistence and discretion equation (Tables 6 
and 7). Other variables such as military chief and finite term are only significant in the 
persistence specification, and the sign of their coefficients is the same as in the spending 
specification. 
  We conclude our analysis by assessing the cross-country determinants of 
responsiveness of fiscal policy. In Table 8 we report the results of estimating equation (5) 
for government spending. Starting with the first column of the table, we can see that an 
only variable that is statistically significant is income. In particular, we find that developed 
countries tend to be less pro-cyclical. This result is in line with other evidence in the 
literature, as discussed in the previous section of the paper. However, when include the 
other set of variables, we find that none of the macro, political and institutional variables is  
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statically significant. In contrast, as argued by Gavin and Perotti (1997a), we find that 
government spending is highly pro-cyclical in Latin America. 
  Different results are obtained when we estimate equation (5) for government 
revenue (Table 9). In particular, we find that while government size, government 
effectiveness, special interests, East Asia & Pacific, and Europe & Central Asia dummies 
are positively associated with revenue responsiveness, openness is negatively related. This 
different behaviour between the responsiveness of government spending and revenue is 
coherent with the fact that countries with pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) spending may not 
have necessarily pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) revenue, and vice versa.    
 
4.3 Robustness Analysis 
  The behaviour of fiscal policy varies across countries.
 Thus, it is interesting to see 
whether our estimated measures of responsiveness, persistence and discretion are different 
across groups of countries. To this purpose, we consider three groups of countries: EMU, 
OECD and non OECD countries. Looking at the panel results reported in Table 10, it is 
possible to see that the responsiveness of both expenditure and revenue to output is lower 
than for the measure of persistence for all set of countries. Moreover, it does not seem that 
countries significantly differ in terms of responsiveness. In contrast, country groups 
systematically differ in terms of discretion and persistence of both expenditure and 
revenue. In particular, EMU countries are those characterized by the lowest estimated 
discretion coefficient for spending, while non OECD countries are those with the highest 
(lowest) level of discretion (persistence).   
  It is also possible to argue that most of the variation in many determinants of 
government spending and revenue, and its persistence, responsiveness and discretion 
components (such as political constraints, income, inflation, etc), occur between developed  
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and developing countries. Thus, both from a theoretical perspective and, especially, from a 
policy point of view it is important to assess whether our analysis is robust within 
developed and developing country grouping. Table 11 reports the results both for the 
discretion, persistence and responsiveness equations for government spending. The first 
two columns refer to the results relative to fiscal discretion respectively for developed and 
developing countries. Looking at these two columns, it seems that there is not much 
discrepancy between the two groups. For both sets of countries, spending discretion is 
negatively related to GDP per capita, country size, government effectiveness and the 
dummy for finite terms. In contrast, other political variables and inflation seem to affect 
spending discretion only for developing countries. 
  The second two columns report the results of the persistence equation for both 
developed and developing countries. Differently from what was obtained for the equation 
regarding the discretion component, it seems that while macroeconomic variables have 
been more relevant for fiscal persistence in developing countries, political and institutional 
variables in general played a role in affecting fiscal persistence in both developed and 
developing countries, even if with some differences.  
  Finally, analyzing the last two columns we can see that the determinants of 
responsiveness of government spending vary between developed and developing countries. 
In particular, while government effectiveness and special interests are essentially the only 
variables found to be significant in the specification for developed countries, openness and 
veto drops are the only variables that have a statistically significant impact on spending 
responsiveness in developing countries. This result suggests that not only the measure of 
responsiveness and cyclicality varies between developing and developed countries, but this 
is also true for its determinants. 
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5. Conclusion  
By making use of a two-step estimation procedure, we pursue a twofold objective 
in this paper. First, we provide an empirical study on the decomposition of fiscal policy 
into three components: responsiveness, persistence and discretion. Second, we analyze the 
determinants of these components. The key conclusions of our analysis are as follows.  
Using a country-specific estimation approach to disentangle the abovementioned 
three components of fiscal policy, both for government spending and revenue, we find 
that, for most of the 132 countries in our sample, fiscal policy is rather more persistent 
than responsive to current economic conditions. More interestingly, we find that, for both 
revenue and spending, persistence is negatively correlated to the discretion component 
thereby suggesting that countries with higher persistence have lower discretion. The above 
conclusions are robust by considering the AMECO dataset for EU countries, for a larger 
time span.  In the second part of our analysis, we carry out a cross-country estimation 
approach to identify the source of fluctuations of persistence, responsiveness and 
discretion components. According to the previous empirical finding, suggesting a negative 
relationship between discretion and persistence, we find that while government size and 
effectiveness and income have negative effects on the discretion component of fiscal 
policy, they tend to increase fiscal persistence. Moreover, we find that macro and political 
and institutional variables are less relevant for responsiveness, once regional dummies are 
considered. 
Our study suggests possible extensions. In fact, comparing for each country the 
estimates of the degree of persistence from government expenditure and revenue equations 
and the starting value of these two series, one could be able to detect signals of potential 
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Table 1. Estimates of Responsiveness (β), Persistence (γ) and Discretion (σ) 
  parameter estimates (1980-2007)    parameter estimates (1980-2007) 
country  βG  βR  γG  γR  σG  σR  country  βG  βR  γG  γR  σG  σR 
Angola 0.02  0.07  -0.29  0.56**  0.16 0.19 Kuwait  -0.01  1.21*** 0.6***  0.29**  0.09 0.12 
Albania 0.92  -0.5  0.63**  0.69  0.06  0.22  Lao  PDR -0.77  2.71**  -0.27 -0.11 0.14  0.14 
United Arab 
Emirates  1.74**  2.38 0.04 0.14 0.09 0.15 Lebanon  -0.26  1.31  0.94*** -0.04  0.18 0.23 
Argentina 1.48**  1.22  0.11  0.13 0.13  0.10  Libya  0.24  -0.47 0.54* 0.34  0.12  0.13 
Australia 0.36  2.17***  0.81***  0.49*** 0.03 0.03 St.  Lucia  0.35 0.98**  0.38**  -0.08  0.08  0.07 
Austria -0.05  2.1***  0.75*** -0.12  0.02 0.03 Sri  Lanka  0.78 0.05  0.3*  0.7*** 0.05  0.05 
Burundi 1.49***  2.83***  0.06  -0.12  0.11  0.11 Lesotho  0.16  0.45  0.5*** 0.76** 0.09  0.08 
Belgium -0.42  -0.38  -0.1  0.57***  0.02  0.02 Luxembourg  0.66*  0.37  0.56** 0.44*  0.05  0.04 
Burkina Faso  2.29  -0.71  -0.38 -0.19 0.12  0.22  Morocco 0.28  1.73**  0.51** 0.47** 0.05  0.07 
Bulgaria 1.3***  2.15***  0.09 -0.23  0.06  0.07  Madagascar  -2.93 23.26  0.18  -1.51 0.19  0.69 
Bahamas -0.02  0.11  -0.02  0.47* 0.04  0.05  Maldives  1.32 3.27  0.15  0.22 0.13  0.22 
Belize 1.5***  0.02  0.22 0.79 0.09  0.10  Mexico  0.86  -0.2  0.19 0.19 0.18  0.15 
Bolivia 1.79  -1.05  0.09  0.16 0.09  0.28  Mali  -0.22  -0.74 0.3  -0.12 0.08  0.22 
Brazil 0.52  -0.62  0.63  0.47 0.10  0.09  Malta  0.39  0  0.55* 0.65**  0.07  0.07 
Barbados  0.83**  0.41**  0.33 0.24 0.07  0.03  Myanmar 1.21***  0.57  -0.02 0.36* 0.10  0.13 
Brunei 2.83  8.61  -0.01  0.06  0.10 0.16 Mozambique  1.22**  1.44** 0.4*** 0.62***  0.14  0.16 
Bhutan  0.3  0.23 0.24 0.23 0.14 0.13 Mauritania  -2.61  -3.05 0.75***  0.17  0.16  0.31 
Botswana 0.98**  0.33  0.24  0.64*** 0.06 0.09 Mauritius  0.33  -1.14 0.6***  0.81* 0.05  0.07 
Central African 
Republic  0.04 0.3  0.32**  0.24 0.17  0.23 Malawi  2.46*  3.65  -0.75 -0.35 0.20  0.23 
Canada 0.18  0.38**  0.91***  0.44** 0.02  0.02  Malaysia  -0.04  0.76**  0.11 0.23 0.05  0.06 
Switzerland -0.97  0.11  0.55**  0.36*** 0.02 0.02 Niger  -0.16 1.99*  0.66  -0.17  0.15  0.24 
Chile 0.31  0  0.77***  0.29*  0.04  0.05  Nigeria 0.24  0.84  0.51* 0.55***  0.25  0.20 
China 1.32***  1.32***  0.97*** 0.93*** 0.04 0.04 Nicaragua  3.37** 3.09**  0.18 0.23 0.17  0.17 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.09  0.34  0.64***  0.79*** 0.08 0.08 Netherlands  0.81  0.69*  1.09*** 0.59*** 0.02 0.03 
Cameroon 1.39***  2.61***  0.09  -0.27 0.09  0.20  Norway  -0.92***  0.99*** 0.27  0.55*** 0.02 0.02 
Congo, Rep.  2.21**  1.08*  0.18  0.15 0.13  0.09  New  Zealand  0.22  -0.49  0.79** 0.62** 0.05  0.05 
Colombia 1.54***  0.91***  0.61*** 0.42**  0.05 0.04 Oman  0.47  0.64** 0.47** 0.59***  0.05  0.05 
Comoros 5.65  7.27  0.28  0.27  0.16 0.17 Pakistan  1.78  0.72 0.4  0.67**  0.06  0.06 
Cape Verde  -1.26  -0.51  0.8*** 0.58***  0.14  0.10  Panama  0.39 0.63  0.27  0.22 0.06  0.10 
Costa Rica  0.66  -0.64  -0.09  0.1 0.11  0.15  Peru  -0.59  -1.16** 1.07*  0.77*** 0.12 0.16 
Cyprus 0.17  -0.38  0.35**  0.58  0.04 0.04 Philippines  -0.09  -0.49  0.59*** 0.94*** 0.07 0.08 
Czech Republic  1.11***  1.63***  0.62*** 0.4**  0.04 0.04 Poland  0.75*** 0.34  0.34***  0.65**  0.04  0.05 
Germany 0.8***  0.85***  0.44*** 0.38*** 0.02 0.01 Portugal  0.41  0.28  0.47** 0.49** 0.07  0.07 
Dominica 0.24  -0.77  0.51***  0.75** 0.07  0.09  Paraguay  1.37*** 1.87*** 0.54*** 0.44**  0.08 0.06 
Denmark -0.55**  0.77**  0.85*** 0.37**  0.01 0.02 Qatar  0.5 0.47*  0.33*  0.2  0.10  0.12 
Dominican Republic  1.26*  0.15  0.4 0.28  0.12  0.12  Romania 0.52  0.58  0.54*** 0.59*** 0.06 0.07 
Ecuador  4.48 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.17 0.15 Senegal  2.19***  1.15* 0.34* 0.45  0.07  0.05 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1.78***  0.17  0.31  0.48**  0.11 0.10 Singapore  2.92**  2.73 0.39 0.17 0.12  0.10 
Spain 0.61***  0.71***  0.9*** 0.73***  0.02  0.02  Sierra  Leone  0.57 1.14  0.4**  0.3 0.21  0.28 
Ethiopia 2.73***  1.5  0.45***  0.58* 0.13  0.12  El  Salvador  1.58** 2.72*** 0.75*** 0.85*** 0.10 0.11 
Finland 0.02  0.6***  0.85***  0.47***  0.03  0.03  Sao Tome and Principe 2.14  5.99*  0.36 0.11 0.25  0.43 
France 0.45*  -0.07  1.07***  0.71*** 0.01 0.01 Suriname  0.36 0.08  0.22  0.13 0.10  0.14 
United Kingdom  -0.16  0.82  0.76*** 0.51**  0.02 0.02 Sweden  -0.21  0.94*** 0.68*** 0.32  0.02 0.02 
Guinea  4.22 3.55 0.24 0.21 0.15 0.15 Swaziland  0.48  1.24*** 0.5***  0.29**  0.08 0.06 
Gambia, The  -0.79  -1.68  -0.12  0.58*** 0.12 0.16 Seychelles  1.27*** -0.44  0.02  0.83***  0.07  0.07 
Guinea-Bissau 0.48  -0.04  -0.03  -0.02  0.17  0.29  Syrian Arab Republic  0.11 0.93  0.64***  0.32* 0.08  0.09 
Equatorial Guinea  0.23  0.47**  0.52*** 0.4**  0.27 0.27 Chad  -0.05  0.78  0.55*** 0.77*** 0.14 0.18 
Greece 0.2  -0.7  0.39  0.88*** 0.04 0.04 Togo  0.3  -0.18 0.55***  0.56  0.11  0.22 
Guyana -0.21  0.15  0.63***  0.06  0.13 0.14 Thailand  0.78***  1.65*** 0.91*** -0.21  0.06 0.05 
Hong Kong, China  0.59  -0.81  0.76*  0.23  0.07  0.12 Tonga  2.05***  0.73  -0.01 0.49  0.14  0.10  
  29
Table 1 (contd.). Estimates of Responsiveness (β), Persistence (γ) and Discretion (σ) 
  parameter estimates (1980-2007)    parameter estimates (1980-2007) 
country  βG  βR  γG  γR  σG  σR  country  βG  βR  γG  γR  σG  σR 
Haiti -3.74  -5.82  0.97***  0.93***  0.28  0.36  Trinidad and Tobago  1.09***  0.55**  0.27 0.27 0.06  0.06 
Hungary 0.23  1.42***  0.71***  0.15  0.04  0.03 Tunisia  2.06  3.72  0.04 0.13 0.06  0.08 
Indonesia 0  0.33  0.25  0.18  0.09 0.06 Turkey  0.06  0.28 0.4  0.14 0.09  0.08 
India 1.23**  0.63**  0.28*  -0.07  0.03  0.03 Taiwan  1.75*  1.38  0.19 -0.01  0.07  0.05 
Ireland 0.26  0.31*  0.51***  0.33*  0.03  0.03 Tanzania  0.95  0.85  0.23 0.04 0.11  0.09 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  0.57  0.51  0.48**  0.64**  0.15 0.17 Uganda  1.28  2.02*  0.16 0.08 0.17  0.18 
Iceland 0.56**  0.82***  0.63***  0.32** 0.03  0.03  Uruguay  0.84*** 1.05** 0.47** 0.41*  0.05  0.06 
Israel 0.77***  0.33  0.48***  0.37* 0.02  0.05  United  States  0.27  1.05*** 0.83*** 0.51**  0.01 0.03 
Italy 1.15***  0.68*  0.81*** 0.8***  0.02 0.02 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines  -0.07 -1.31  0.58* 0.59* 0.09  0.08 
Jamaica -1.1  -1.24  0.4**  0.57**  0.07  0.10  Venezuela, RB  1.07  -0.29 -0.04 0.63  0.11  0.11 
Jordan  0.42 0.07 0.36 0.24 0.11 0.09 Vietnam  -1.15  -1.27 0.28  0.83***  0.14  0.10 
Japan 0.4**  1.1***  0.83***  0.42 0.02  0.03  Vanuatu  0.95  1.21** 0.47** 0.35** 0.13  0.12 
Kenya 0.96**  0.47*  0.26  0.62***  0.08  0.05  Samoa -1.4  0.37  0.49**  0.36*  0.10  0.14 
Cambodia  -11.96*  -9.63**  -0.72 -0.37 0.22  0.27  South Africa  -0.59  0.69*  0.68*** 0.49**  0.03 0.03 
Kiribati 0.97**  0.15  0.14  0.25 0.14  0.18  Zambia  0.9  -0.27 0.3  -0.21 0.11  0.14 
Korea, Rep.  0.25  0.03  0.88***  0.51*** 0.04 0.04 Zimbabwe  0.08  -0.35 0.63* 0.88***  0.16  0.13 
 
Notes: E – expenditure; R – revenue. *, ***, ***, significant at respectively 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 
 
 







G  1     
γ
R  0.395 1     
σ
G  -0.391 -0.279  1   
σ
R  -0.388 -0.309  0.900  1 
 
 
Table 3. Results with AMECO dataset 
  parameter estimates (1960-2007) 
country 
G β ˆ  
R β ˆ  
G γˆ  
R γˆ   G σ ˆ  
R σ ˆ  
Austria  0.59*** 0.52**  0.78*** 0.76*** 0.02 0.02 
Belgium  0.97*** 0.39*  0.66*** 0.79*** 0.03 0.01 
Germany  0.51** 0.42*  0.73***  0.73***  0.02  0.03 
Denmark  0.36 1.15*  0.90***  0.68***  0.03  0.04 
Spain  0.28* 0.39  0.99***  0.93***  0.02  0.03 
Finland  0.24*  0.39*** 0.93*** 0.80*** 0.04 0.04 
France  0.06 -0.15  0.90***  1.03***  0.01  0.02 
United Kingdom  0.47* 0.54**  0.85***  0.81***  0.04  0.03 
Greece  0.08 0.16 0.88***  0.77***  0.04  0.03 
Ireland  -0.01 -0.02 0.69***  0.65***  0.04  0.03 
Italy  0.59*** 0.14  0.75*** 0.89*** 0.02 0.03 
Netherlands  0.46*** 0.55*** 0.85*** 0.81*** 0.02 0.02 
Portugal  0.44*** 0.5***  0.86*** 0.67*** 0.04 0.04 
Sweden  -0.39 0.03  0.77***  0.79***  0.03  0.03 
United States  0.28  0.76*** 0.83*** 0.59*** 0.02 0.02 
Japan  0.32*** 0.27*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.04 0.03 




Table 4. Determinants of Spending Discretion (
G
i σ ˆ ) 
 









































































































Europe & Central Asia      
0.074 
(0.47) 
  Latin America & 
Caribbean 
    
0.470 
(2.48)** 
  Middle East & North 
Africa 








Sub-Saharan Africa      
0.113 
(0.66) 
  R-square  0.67  0.73 0.78 0.82 
  Observations  111  110 106 106 









Table 5. Determinants of Spending Persistence (
G
i γˆ )  
 



















































Institutional  Government 




















































Europe & Central Asia      
-0.132 
(-1.51) 
  Latin America & 
Caribbean      
-0.088 
(-1.36) 
  Middle East & North 








Sub-Saharan Africa      
-0.059 
(-0.66) 






 Observation  111  110 106 106 








Table 6. Determinants of Revenue Discretion (
R
i σ ˆ ) 
 



















































Institutional  Government 




















































Europe & Central Asia      
0.112 
(0.64) 
  Latin America & 
Caribbean      
0.217 
(1.22) 
  Middle East & North 








Sub-Saharan Africa      
-0.032 
(-0.16) 
 R-square  0.63  0.68 0.77 0.78 
  Observation  111  110 106 106 






Table 7. Determinants of Revenue Persistence (
R
i γˆ )  
 



















































Institutional  Government 




















































Europe & Central Asia      
-0.109 
(-0.94) 
  Latin America & 
Caribbean      
0.016 
(0.20) 
  Middle East & North 








Sub-Saharan Africa      
0.088 
(0.77) 






  Observation  111  110 106 106 








Table 8. Determinants of Spending responsiveness (
G
i β ˆ )  
 



















































Institutional  Government 




















































Europe & Central Asia      
0.316 
(1.66)* 
  Latin America & 
Caribbean      
0.462 
(3.00)*** 
  Middle East & North 








Sub-Saharan Africa      
0.035 
(0.15) 






  Observation  111  110 106 106 








Table 9. Determinants of Revenue responsiveness (
R
i β ˆ )  
 



















































Institutional  Government 




















































Europe & Central Asia      
0.906 
(3.75)*** 
  Latin America & 
Caribbean      
0.050 
(0.30) 
  Middle East & North 








Sub-Saharan Africa      
0.334 
(1.26) 






 Observation  111  110 106 106 









Table 10. Panel regressions 
 
Parameter estimates (1980-2007) 
Observations  Responsiveness Persistence  Discretion  Country Group 
 
  G R 
G β ˆ  
R β ˆ  
G γˆ  
R γˆ   G σ ˆ  
R σ ˆ  
EMU  312  312  0.20*** 0.22*** 0.82*** 0.76*** 0.035 0.035 
OECD  760  760  0.25*** 0.23*** 0.80*** 0.82*** 0.054 0.055 
Not  OECD  2974  2974  0.25*** 0.21*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.138 0.194 




Table 11. Developed and developing countries (government expenditure) 
 
 Discretion  Persistence  Responsiveness 
Explanatory variables  ˆ
G
developed σ   ˆ
G
developing σ   ˆ
G
developed γ   ˆ
G
developing γ  
G
developed β ˆ  
G
developing β ˆ  


































































































































































 R-square  0.79 0.59  -  -  -  - 
  Goodness of fit  χ





  Observation  27  79 27 79 27 79 
Note: *,**,*** respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. Goodness of fit: χ
2 statistics for persistence and responsiveness, 
R-square for discretion.







Appendix 1 – Data and sources 
We use annual data from the IMF World Economic Outlook for 132 countries over the 
period 1980–2007. The choice of our sample is dictated by data availability. We started 
with a sample of 180 countries but we had to drop some (forty eight) either because fiscal 
data were not available or because the time span was too short for a meaningful estimation 
of time-series regressions in the paper. We decided to keep countries for which we have at 
least 18 years of data (see Table A1.1). Table A1.2 reports for each variable used in the 
time-series regressions the number of country-specific observations. 
 
Table A1.1. Country sample 
Country list  
Albania  Congo, Republic of  Iran, Islamic Republic of  Myanmar 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Angola Costa  Rica  Ireland  Netherlands  Suriname 
Argentina Côte  d'Ivoire  Israel New  Zealand  Swaziland 
Australia Cyprus Italy  Nicaragua  Sweden 
Austria Czech  Republic  Jamaica  Niger  Switzerland 
Bahamas, The  Denmark  Japan  Nigeria  Syrian Arab Republic 
Barbados Dominica  Jordan  Norway 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
Belgium Dominican  Republic  Kenya  Oman  Tanzania 
Belize Ecuador  Kiribati  Pakistan  Thailand 
Bhutan Egypt Korea  Panama  Togo 
Bolivia El  Salvador  Kuwait  Paraguay  Tonga 
Botswana Equatorial  Guinea 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic  Peru Trinidad  and  Tobago 
Brazil Ethiopia  Lebanon  Philippines  Tunisia 
Brunei Darussalam  Finland  Lesotho  Poland  Turkey 
Bulgaria France  Libya  Portugal  Uganda 
Burkina Faso  Gambia, The  Luxembourg  Qatar  United Arab Emirates 
Burundi Germany  Madagascar  Romania  United  Kingdom 
Cambodia Greece  Malawi  Samoa  United  States 
Cameroon Guinea  Malaysia 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe  Uruguay 
Canada Guinea-Bissau  Maldives  Senegal  Vanuatu 
Cape Verde  Guyana  Mali  Seychelles  Venezuela 
Central African Republic  Haiti  Malta  Sierra Leone  Vietnam 
Chad  Hong Kong SAR  Mauritania  Singapore  Zambia 
Chile Hungary  Mauritius  South  Africa  Zimbabwe 
China Iceland  Mexico  Spain    
Colombia India  Morocco  Sri  Lanka    







Table A1.2. Number of observations 
 
Country  G R RGDP  Inflation  Country  G R RGDP Inflation  Country  G R RGDP  Inflation 
Albania 26 26  28  18  Greece 28 28  28  28  Oman 28 28  28  28 
Angola 28 28  28  28  Guinea 28 28  28  28  Pakistan 28 28  28  28 
Argentina 28 28  28  28  Guinea-Bissau 28 28  28  28  Panama 28 28  28  28 
Australia 28 28  28  28  Guyana 28 28  28  28  Paraguay 28 28  28  28 
Austria 28 28  28  28  Haiti 28 28  28  28  Peru 28 28  28  28 
Bahamas,  The 28 28  28  28  Hong  Kong  SAR 28 28  28  28  Philippines 28 28  28  28 
Barbados 28 28  28  28  Hungary 28 28  28  28  Poland 27 27  28  28 
Belgium 28 28  28  28  Iceland 28 28  28  28  Portugal 28 28  28  28 
Belize 27 27  28  28  India 20 20  28  28  Qatar 28 28  28  28 
Bhutan 28 28  28  28  Indonesia 28 28  28  28  Romania 28 28  28  28 
Bolivia 28 28  28  28 
Iran, Islamic 
Republic  of 28 28  28  28  Samoa 28 28  28  28 
Botswana 26 28  28  28  Ireland 28 28  28  28  São  Tomé  and  Príncipe 28 28  28  28 
Brazil 27 27  28  28  Israel 28 28  28  28  Senegal 28 28  28  28 
Brunei  Darussalam 23 23  24  25  Italy 28 28  28  28  Seychelles 27 27  28  28 
Bulgaria 23 23  28  27  Jamaica 28 28  28  28  Sierra  Leone 28 28  28  28 
Burkina  Faso 28 28  28  28  Japan 28 28  28  28  Singapore 28 28  28  28 
Burundi 28 28  28  28  Jordan 28 28  28  28  South  Africa 28 28  28  28 
Cambodia 21 21  28  21  Kenya 28 28  28  28  Spain 28 28  28  28 
Cameroon 28 28  28  28  Kiribati 28 28  28  28  Sri  Lanka 28 28  28  28 
Canada 28 28  28  28  Korea 28 28  28  28  St.  Lucia 28 28  28  28 
Cape  Verde 28 28  28  28  Kuwait 28 28  28  28 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 24 24  28  28 
Central African 
Republic 27 27  28  28 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 28 28  28  28  Suriname 28 28  28  28 
Chad 25 28  28  28  Lebanon 28 28  28  28  Swaziland 27 27  28  28 
Chile 27 27  28  28  Lesotho 28 28  28  28  Sweden 28 28  28  28 
China 28 28  28  28  Libya 28 28  28  28  Switzerland 25 25  28  28 
Colombia 26 26  28  28  Luxembourg 28 28  28  28  Syrian  Arab  Republic 28 28  28  28 
Comoros 27 27  28  28  Madagascar 28 28  28  28 
Taiwan Province of 
China 28 28  28  28 
Congo,  Republic  of 28 28  28  28  Malawi 28 28  28  28  Tanzania 28 28  28  28 
Costa  Rica 28 28  28  28  Malaysia 23 23  28  28  Thailand 28 28  28  28 
Côte  d'Ivoire 27 27  28  28  Maldives 28 28  28  28  Togo 28 28  28  28 
Cyprus 28 28  28  28  Mali 28 28  28  28  Tonga 28 28  28  28 
Czech  Republic 28 28  28  28  Malta 28 28  28  28  Trinidad  and  Tobago 26 26  28  28 
Denmark 28 28  28  28  Mauritania 28 28  28  28  Tunisia 28 28  28  28 
Dominica 27 27  28  28  Mauritius 28 28  28  28  Turkey 21 21  28  28 
Dominican  Republic 28 28  28  28  Mexico 28 28  28  28  Uganda 25 26  28  28 
Ecuador 28 28  28  28  Morocco 28 28  28  28  United  Arab  Emirates 28 28  28  28 
Egypt 28 28  28  28  Mozambique 28 28  28  28  United  Kingdom 28 28  28  28 
El  Salvador 27 27  28  28  Myanmar 26 26  28  28  United  States 28 28  28  28 
Equatorial  Guinea 28 28  28  27  Netherlands 28 28  28  28  Uruguay 22 22  28  28 
Ethiopia 28 28  28  28  New  Zealand 28 28  28  28  Vanuatu 28 28  28  28 
Finland 28 28  28  28  Nicaragua 28 28  28  28  Venezuela 20 20  28  28 
France 28 28  28  28  Niger 28 28  28  28  Vietnam 28 28  28  28 
Gambia,  The 27 27  28  28  Nigeria 23 23  28  28  Zambia 28 28  28  28 
Germany 28 28  28  28  Norway 28 28  28  28  Zimbabwe 27 27  28  28 





Data series used in the country-specific regressions are: a) Real GDP, b) Inflation: 
calculated as annual percentage change of the GDP deflator, c) Index of oil prices: 
computed as the logarithm of real petroleum annual average spot price. Source: 
International Financial Statistics (IFS).  
 
Data series used in the cross-sectional regressions are: 
 
Government size: Logarithm of the ratio of government spending to GDP. Source: Penn 
World Tables 6.1 (PWT). 
 
Income: Logarithm of per-capita income. Source: Penn World Tables 6.1 (PWT). 
 
Openness: The ratio of exports plus imports to GDP at constant prices. Source: Penn 
World Tables 6.1 (PWT). 
 
Inflation:  Calculated as the difference in the logarithm of the GDP deflator. Source: 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
 
Country Size: Calculated as the logarithm of the population. Source: World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
 
Government Effectiveness:  Measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies.  Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 
 
Political System: Dummy variable that takes a value of zero for Presidential regime, the 
value one for the Assembly-elected Presidential regime and two for Parliamentary regime. 
Source: Database of Political Institutions (DPI 2004). Original series identifier: SYSTEM  
 
Parties Concentration: The Herfindahl Index calculated as the sum of the squared set 
shares of all parties in the government. Equals NA if there is no parliament or if there are 
no parties in the legislature and blank if any government or opposition party seats are 
blank. Source: Database of Political Institutions (DPI 2004). Series identifier: HERFTOT. 
 
Veto drops: This variable counts the percent of veto players who drop from the 
government in any given year. Source: Database of Political Institutions ( DPI 2004). 
Original series identifier: STABS  
 
Special Interests: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the party of the largest 
government party represents any special interests and zero otherwise. Source: Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI 2004). Original series identifier: GOVSPEC. 
 
Military Chief Executive: Definition of the variable depends on the following question: 
Is Chief Executive a military officer? It takes the value one if the source (Europa or Banks) 
includes a rank in their title, 0 otherwise. If chief executives were described as officers 
with no indication of formal retirement when they assumed office, they are always listed as 
officers for the duration of their term. If chief executives were formally retired military  
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officers upon taking office, then this variable gets a 0. Source: Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI 2004). Original series identifier: MILITARY. 
 
Finite Term: Dummy variable that takes the value one if there exists a constitutional limit 
on the number of years the executive can serve before new elections must be called and 
zero otherwise. Deviating from the convention, a zero is recorded if a limit is not explicitly 
stated. Variable gets a zero value in the cases where the constitution with year limits is 
suspended or un-enforced. Source: Database of Political Institutions (DPI 2004). Original 
series identifier: FINITTRM. 
 
Set of regional variables: a) Distance from Equator, computed as the vertical distance of 
parallels from the equator, b) set of six binary variables (East Asia & Pacific, Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa) which take value one if the country belongs one of the above regions. 
Variables are taken from Andy Rose’s site: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/. 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Further analysis on fiscal developments 
Comparing for each country the estimates of the degree of persistence from 
government expenditure and revenue equations and the starting value of these two series, 
one could be able to detect signals of potential fiscal deterioration. Those results could 
bring additional information regarding the approach of testing the behaviour of public 
finances, via the intertemporal government budget constraint, such as performed, for 
instance, by Afonso (2005) and Afonso and Rault (2007). In particular, if government 




i γ γ < ), we could 
infer something about the existence of conditions for fiscal deterioration. Linked to this is 
the idea that a persistent series contains a permanent component, whereby past shocks 
exert an ongoing effect on the level of the series. Therefore, the bigger the magnitude of 
the persistence (measured byγ ), the bigger the impact of past fiscal policy shocks. From 




i γ γ < , policy-induced 
shocks have long-run consequences on the series such that, when expenditure increases, 
improvements in the budget balance may be harder to attain because of the slower 




i γ γ =  holds, would 
developments of the government spending and revenue series compensate each other in 
such a way to avoid fiscal deterioration.  
Focusing only on countries for which our estimation results indicate that the 
persistence component is statistically significant (see Table 1 in the main text), we plot in 
Figure A2.1 the magnitude of difference in the persistence component of government  
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spending and revenues. The values range from a minimum of -0.40 (higher overall revenue 
persistence) to a maximum of 0.50 (higher overall spending persistence). The bold circle in 




i γ γ ˆ ˆ = . However, in order to formally test the 
presence of fiscal deterioration equation (1) and (2) should be simultaneously estimated. 
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